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Introduction 
 
In 1939, Winston Churchill, then serving the United Kingdom as First Lord 
of the Admiralty, famously held that Russia was “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, 
inside an enigma” (Cowell, 2008). Currently, many in the West would feel inclined 
to agree with this sentiment, as Russia’s actions often bemuse and surprise Western 
laypeople and specialists alike. One must look no further for evidence of this reality 
than Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent incursion into the Donbas 
region; these engagements caught an overwhelmingly languid West by surprise, as 
evidenced by the West’s collective lackluster response to Russia’s bellicosity.   
Russia is not, as Churchill holds, so much an enigma, as it is misunderstood. 
Endemic to Western policymakers is a fundamental misunderstanding of why 
Russia behaves the way it does. Many in the West tend to apply the logic of 
liberalism to Russian behavior; these analysts and policymakers believe that all 
states should accept the Western-oriented world order of liberal institutionalism 
(Toal, 2017). This Western-centric worldview ignores the fact that there are other 
factors that nations value more deeply than notions of democracy and personal 
liberty. The Russian Federation falls into this category of states. Accordingly, it is 
not so much that Russia’s behavior is bemusing and enigmatic; instead, it is simply 
that the West fundamentally misunderstands Russia’s motivations in the 
international space. 
The aforementioned Churchill quotation is, however, only half complete. 
Churchill would declare that there was perhaps a key to solving this conundrum: 
that key, according to Churchill, was Russian national interest (Tsygankov, 2019). 
Ostensibly then, the great challenge to understanding Russia, and, for the purpose 
of this article, Russian incursions under Putin, is to understand what constitutes 
Russia’s national interest.  
 Initially, the central question that guided this article’s research was: does 
Vladimir Putin instigate incursions during times of relatively low popularity to 
bolster his domestic standing? In this article, the term “incursion” will be defined 
as follows: Russia’s use of military force or its proxies both within Russia and in 
sovereign states beyond Moscow’s purview. This is not to say that factors such as 
the weaponization of natural resources such as oil and natural gas are benign 
dynamics that matter little to understanding Russian behavior; on the contrary, 
these dynamics are often seen as precursors to conflict within the post-Soviet space 
and are therefore very important to any discussion of Russian conflict.  
The logic guiding this initial hypothesis was relatively simple; it supposed 
that Putin, as the head of the Russian state, governed primarily with his political 
self-interest in mind. Under this lens, Russia’s national interest is, quite simply, 
Putin’s political self-interest. Thus, any decision undertaken by Moscow would 
have to be politically beneficial for Putin; the ultimate end for Putin, then, is 
  
reelection. Implementing policies such as state reform or adventurism abroad 
would only occur if they would ultimately aid Putin’s chances at the ballot box. 
Following this logic, it would hardly be a stretch to assert that Putin would need to 
rely on relatively low-cost, yet dramatic, means to reestablish his high standing with 
Russian denizens during times of low popularity. Thus, this article hypothesized 
that incursions were the means through which Putin bolstered his domestic standing 
when necessary. In other words, domestic considerations, namely the pressure to 
remain popular and therefore legitimate, were informing Putin’s foreign policy 
decisions.  
 This hypothesis presupposed critical, yet measurable, dynamics as fact. 
The first assumption baked into this article’s initial hypothesis was that Putin’s 
domestic popularity is legitimate. Frye et al. (2016) conducted a series of list 
experiments in 2015 in an endeavor to estimate the accuracy of domestic support 
for Putin while allowing respondents to obscure their sentiments vis-à-vis the 
occupier of Russia’s highest office. The authors’ analysis of their list experiments 
indicated that support for Putin is legitimate; the authors found that “approximately 
six to nine percent of respondents hide their opposition to President Putin when 
asked directly” (Frye et al., 2016). This finding suggests that much of the support 
for Putin is authentic. Whether this popularity is based on reality or an assiduously 
choreographed Kabuki Theatre is hardly relevant; neither the former nor the latter 
negates the fact that Putin is genuinely popular among the majority of Russians.  
 The second initial assumption addressed Putin’s response to the ebbs in his 
domestic popularity. It supposed a correlation between dips in Putin’s popularity 
and incursions. That is to say, in formulating Russia’s foreign policy, Putin was 
moved so seriously by domestic considerations, namely his approval rating, that he 
was compelled to respond with the full force of the Russian military or its proxies.  
Evidence supporting this presupposition was scant. First, according to data 
from the Levada Center, Putin’s approval rating is consistently high. Aside from 
1999, when Putin was largely unknown and unproven in the political arena, Putin’s 
approval rating, whether as prime minister or as president, has never dipped below 
sixty-one percent (Levada). Second, and much more concerning, was the dearth of 
polling evidence that built a proverbial bridge between low approval ratings and 
incursions. Take, for example, the run-up to the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. In 
the months leading up to this conflict, Putin’s approval rating never dipped below 
eighty percent1 (Levada, 2008). 
Moreover, before Russia’s involvement in Syria in September 2015, Putin’s 
approval rating was consistently much closer to ninety percent than eighty (Levada 
2015). Clearly, in the prefatory stages of both the Georgian and Syrian conflicts, 
Putin’s approval ratings were such that they could not even satisfy the low 
popularity requirement of this article’s initial hypothesis. In fact, it would be more 
accurate to argue that these approval ratings and how they relate to their given 
  
conflicts directly contradict the initial hypothesis of this article.  
The outlier of this admittedly small data set was Putin’s approval rating 
before Russia annexed Crimea and instigated a frozen conflict in the Donbas region 
of eastern Ukraine (Brooke, 2020). These conflicts proved to be the only significant 
incursions that satisfied the low popularity requirement. According to polling data 
from Levada, Putin’s approval rating immediately before the annexation of Crimea 
hit a low of sixty-one percent in November 2013 (2013). Not long after, in February 
2014, “little green men” began seizing critical facilities on the Crimean Peninsula 
(Pifer, 2019). Again, this incursion represents the only major foray that proceeded 
a period of somewhat persistent, low approval for Putin. However, considering the 
geopolitical and security implications of losing Ukraine to the West, it is more 
analytically sound to qualify the Crimea annexation as a geopolitical strategic act 
of national interest.  
In a last ditched effort to save the hypothesis that was so clearly on life 
support, this article turned to yet another Levada indicator. As Bo Petersson astutely 
observed, there is a paradox by which Putin’s personal approval rating remains 
mainly in the stratosphere, but popular approval of the government remains 
persistently low (2016). Perhaps approval of the government could serve as a more 
accurate proxy for approval of Putin. If this was the case, and a correlation existed 
between low approval of the government and subsequent foreign incursions, the 
analysis could continue. However, upon scrupulous analysis of this data set, no 
convincing correlation was found.2 
Finally, Russia’s engagement in Syria presents the least convincing account 
for this article’s initial hypothesis. Using either Putin’s approval rating, or the 
approval rating of the Russian government, the conclusion is the same: domestic 
concerns did not inform Putin’s decision to prop up the Assad regime.3  
Ultimately, the lack of a correlation between domestic popularity and 
foreign incursions killed any inertia that this article’s initial hypothesis may have 
had. The only substantive conclusion that can be drawn from the aforementioned 
data is that Putin’s foreign policy decisions are almost entirely divorced from 
concerns surrounding domestic popularity. Putin is motivated by other 
considerations when deciding when to engage in protracted or rapid military 





Evidently, under Putin, Russian national interest is not simply what is in 
Putin’s political self-interest. Putin’s aggressive foreign policy decisions cannot be 
sufficiently explained as elaborate displays aimed at placating a disaffected 
populace. Thus, this article required a new thesis. Simon Saradzhyan, the founding 
  
director of the Russia Matters Project at Harvard’s Kennedy School, provided the 
stimulus for just that. In an article titled, “When Does Vladimir Putin’s Russia Send 
in the Troops,” Saradzhyan identified two necessary conditions for Putin to 
authorize the use of military force: “First, Putin has to see an acute threat to Russia’s 
vital national interests that he thinks cannot be neutralized by any means short of 
force…[second] Moscow must have a reasonable hope that such actions would 
yield a net reduction in threats to Russia’s vital interests” (Saradzhyan, 2018). 
Using Saradzhyan’s aforementioned necessary conditions as a foundation, the 
remainder of this article will develop a comprehensive analytical framework that 
explains Russian incursions during the Putin era.  
Necessary for understanding this article’s framework and its foundation 
rests upon knowledge of Russia’s national interest(s). Once again, Simeon 
Saradzhyan’s work provides a foundation for explanation. Saradzhyan lists 
Russia’s national interests in order of importance. Although Saradzhyan lists more, 
the first three are the most relevant for the development of this article’s analytical 
framework:  
(1) prevent armed aggression against Russia and secession of territories from Russia, (2) 
ensure Russian allies’ survival and their active cooperation with Russia; ensure Russia is 
surrounded by friendly states, among which it can play a lead role and cooperate with which 
it can thrive, and (3) prevent the emergence and/or expansion of individual hostile powers 
and/or hostile alliances on or near Russian borders 
The model advanced by this article holds that each area of Russian national 
interest is supplemented by a secondary set of yet mentioned conditions. This model 
provides an additional layer of critical analysis in the ultimate endeavor to cogently 
understand Russian foreign policy so that Moscow’s behavior becomes more 
predictable and, at the least, more comprehensible.  
Saradzhyan’s first area of national interest is inextricably linked to Russia’s 
seemingly perpetual desire to establish a strong state. For Putin, a leader who 
inherited a state mired in weakness, reestablishing the strong state was seen as a 
precondition for achieving the broader geopolitical goals of increased integration 
with the international community and the simultaneous preservation of great power 
status. The latter was seen to provide security and stability in the capricious and 
often violent post-Soviet space. (Tsygankov, 2014). Contrary to conventional 
Western wisdom, Putin’s endeavor to establish the strong state was not akin to the 
empire-building of Peter the Great or that of the Soviet Union; instead, Putin 
preferred a strong, stable Russia that could cooperate with the West when 
necessary, but that could also challenge the West when it encroached on Russia’s 
privileged zone of influence. Thus, the strong state was a means to an end; 
nevertheless, establishing the strong state was a necessary condition for Putin’s 
broader geopolitical goals.  
The second area of Russian national interest is closely linked with another 
paradigm shift of Russian policy: the promotion of bilateralism. Recognizing the 
  
prohibitively high costs associated with integrating the post-Soviet space, Putin and 
his regime realized that it was necessary to transition to a regional strategy of 
pragmatic bilateral relations (Tsygankov, 2019). Divorcing the rhetoric of Russian 
bilateralism from traditional understandings of the concept underscores a 
fundamental truth regarding how Russian views its neighbors: bilateralism, as 
espoused by Russia, is tantamount to collective unilateralism. In other words, 
Russia uses its coercive power in the region to spearhead inequitable partnerships.  
Regional partnerships will only be implemented if they further a Russian end and 
involve a partner who is willing to reciprocate Russian interests.4 
Other economic arrangements underscore Russia’s desire to be surrounded 
by subservient states. The amount of Russian capital in the Georgian energy sector 
highlights the unilateral essence that permeates Russian bilateralism. Inter RAO, a 
leading Russian energy firm, owns seventy-five percent of Georgia’s energy 
distribution company Telasi (Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili, 2015). Moreover, 
Georgia’s most powerful and productive hydroelectric dam is also under the control 
of Inter RAO (ibid., 2015). These holdings allow Russia to have a disproportionate 
say in how and when the Georgian economy will develop.  Although bilateral in 
spirit, these agreements highlight Russia’s desire to negotiate and operate in an 
environment where it is the hegemon. 
Nevertheless, these aforementioned partnerships demonstrate that Russia is 
not averse to cooperation. As Saradzhyan notes, Russia wants to ensure the survival 
of its allies in an environment of active cooperation (Saradzhyan, 2018). So long as 
states within the post-Soviet space remain dedicated to reciprocating Russian 
interests, Russia, to the best of its ability, will be a guarantor of stability; however, 
states that actively undermine Russian interests, or that foment or suffer from unrest 
within their borders, subject themselves to potential Russian intervention.  
The third area of Russian national interest is fundamentally related to the 
concept of the Near Abroad. The term “near abroad” first emerged as a practical 
geopolitical tool used to orient scholars and policymakers alike to the region 
roughly encompassing Eurasia (Toal, 2017). The term is comprehensive: 
simultaneously, it connotes continuity and change as well as proximity and 
distance. All nations have their own near abroad; however, few are as convoluted 
as the environment of the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, understanding Russia’s 
near abroad is critical for understanding its present. Russia conceptualizes, and 
subsequently responds to, threats in its backyard. As Toal holds, Russia’s near 
abroad is a geopolitical field characterized by myriad actors and territories whose 
interactions create a cacophony of competing interests; the field is dominated by 
post-colonial states. However, regional concentrations of ethnic minorities who 
often find themselves loyal to the old colonial power center create the conditions 
for territorial fragmentation (ibid., 2017). Finally, a looming great power, the West, 
exerts its influence on the periphery of this environment, further complicating 
  
interactions within the region (ibid., 2017). Obsessed with stability, Putin is faced 
with navigating this incredibly convoluted regional landscape. Consequently, any 
threat to this sphere that has the potential to undermine Moscow’s established status 
quo is met with decisive action.  
The final area of this article’s analytical model deals with Russia’s drive for 
great power status. Although this concept is not explicitly mentioned in 
Saradzhyan’s model, it is a critical component of Russia’s foreign policy under 
Putin. Perhaps most important in this push towards great power status is the desire 
to undermine the cohesion of the “U.S.-led international liberal order” (Stronski & 
Sokolsky, 2017). Russian diplomats have consistently lamented the apparent 
hypocrisy of American foreign policy. The international liberal order appeals 
heavily to transnational rules and institutions that ultimately promote notions of 
multilateralism and cooperation. However, the Russians and Putin are no exception 
to this, often feel that these rules apply to all but the United States.  
This behavior is hardly novel. Thucydides, in his recollection of the 
Peloponnesian War, famously held that in a private meeting between the Athenians 
and the weaker Melians, the Athenians demanded Melian acquiescence: “since you 
know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between 
equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must” (Grafton, 2009). This quote truly gets to the essence of great power politics. 
Russia similarly ignores the laws of the established international order when its 
critical interests are at stake. Although many U.S. policymakers characterize 
Russian aggression as Putin’s imperial ambitions, the true goal of Russia as a great 
power is to challenge U.S. global hegemony, especially when its own interests hang 
in the balance. 
Moreover, the projection of great power status is an end in and of itself, as 
achieving this goal enhances Putin’s legitimacy as a leader. The logic of Russia’s 
great power politics is zero-sum. It seeks to make gains at the expense of the West, 
and actively seeks to insert itself, be it diplomatically or militarily, into areas where 
the U.S. has blundered (Stronski & Sokolsky, 2017).  
The nuances of this fourth area, great power status, suggest great power 
logic may contain shortcomings that are especially acute in the post-Soviet space. 
Chief among them is the primacy great power thinking awards to state actors. To 
remedy this, the logic of great power politics needs to be slightly augmented by 
providing space for the necessary context and manifold dynamics that are at play 
in the byzantine conflicts that characterize the post-Soviet Space. Russia under 
Putin is undoubtedly seeking great power status. However, this should be 
understood as the pursuit of an autonomous great power policy. What is meant by 
autonomous great power status? It simply means that Russia is indeed seeking great 
power status but on its own terms. As an autonomous actor, Moscow leaves room 
for pragmatic cooperation with competitors both at and beneath the level of the 
  
state, so long as that cooperation takes place in accordance with Moscow’s 
interests. However, as an autonomous actor in the often crowded and chaotic 
international system, Russia will not hesitate to respond to other actors with force 
if it feels its critical national interests are being threatened or undermined.  
Russia is not a great power in the traditional sense: it is not on a lustful quest 
for empire or on the path to promulgate a global order based on a set of Russian-
held values. Instead, Putin is carving out a space for Moscow to have a seat at the 
table when its local, regional, or global interests are threatened. The bedrock of this 
article’s analytical model is that Russia’s fundamental motivation has the means to 
challenge unilateral action and to make the other world powers twice about 
interfering in Russia’s affairs.  
This proposed theoretical model will be tested through four case studies, 
utilizing content analysis and process-tracing. The first case study will cover the 
Second Chechen War, a conflict within Russia’s borders that wholly corresponds 
with the first area of the framework mentioned above. The second case study will 
be of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. This conflict primarily corresponds with the 
elements of area two. However, elements of the fourth area are also present in this 
conflict and will be discussed accordingly. The third case study will focus on 
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. This ongoing conflict will be studied using the 
third area of this article’s analytical framework: the concept of Russia’s near 
abroad. The final case study will be that of the ongoing conflict in Syria. This 
conflict reinforces the notion of Russia as a great power, as it represents the first-
ever conflict the Russian Federation, the Russian Empire, or the Soviet Union, has 
ever fought exclusively in Arab lands (Trenin, 2018). Thus, it will be critically 




 The dominant literature surrounding contemporary Russian foreign policy 
classifies Russia’s newfound aggression under Putin as the behavior of a state re-
emerging as a great power. Conceptualization of great power behavior has 
proponents in the balance of power theory. Morton Kaplan’s balance of power 
theory articulated an international system in which national actors achieved 
equilibrium and stability through competition and cooperation (Kaplan, 1958). This 
theory is consistent with the later work of Eugene Rostow. In holding that the state 
is the key institution of the global political system, Rostow presupposes that the 
only means for countering the power and policy of a subversive state is the power 
and policy of a state dedicated to maintaining the international order (Rostow, 
1962). Moreover, because of the absence of a well-defined international system, 
Rostow understands the maintenance of order to be the primary responsibility of 
the truly great powers, either through competition or cooperation (ibid., 1962).   
  
 The research of Karl Deutsch and David Singer highlighted the relationship 
between the number of relevant actors in the international system and the system’s 
stability. Ultimately, their work found that, as the number of poles increased in a 
given system, the number of resources would also diffuse more widely. This 
diffusion of resources would, in turn, decrease the probability of conflict. Thus, in 
the short term, a multipolar world is more stable than a bipolar one (Deutsch & 
Singer, 1964). Building on this scholarship, Rosecrance held that neither the system 
of bipolarity nor the system of multipolarity was sufficient for solving the general 
problems that plagued the contemporary international system; instead, Rosecrance 
proposes an intermediate international system: a system of bi-multipolarity 
(Rosecrance, 1966).  
 As the scholarship relating to the balance of power evolved, structural 
realists such as Kenneth Waltz entered the fray. Waltz rejected the previous unit-
level analyses, which framed international politics in terms of its principal actors, 
states, in favor of analysis at the systems level (Waltz, 1979). The implications of 
this theory directly contradicted the work of earlier scholars. Because even the most 
powerful states are constrained by the system in which they operate, the inequality 
of states is more conducive to peace and stability than is harmony among many 
states (ibid., 1979). The structural logic underpinning this conclusion is evident: a 
multipolar world, according to Waltz, is more susceptible to violence than a bipolar 
one precisely because the multipolar system involves more equal players, which, in 
turn, creates the conditions for more usurpation and chaos.  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a dramatic paradigm shift: 
the international system transitioned from bipolar to unipolar. America, for a brief 
period, found itself as the sole global hegemon. Accompanying this paradigm shift 
was a similar shift in great power discourse and analysis. Francis Fukuyama 
famously held that the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of history. More 
measured analysis from Christopher Layne argued that U.S. global hegemony was 
transient; the systemic constraints, as first articulated by Waltz, would ultimately 
create the conditions for sufficiently powerful states to challenge U.S. unipolarity 
(Layne, 1993). 
Moreover, Barry Posen was skeptical of the durability of the unipolar 
system, arguing that the unipolar system is plagued by a “self-abrasive” structure 
that will ultimately create the conditions for its own demise (Posen, 2011). Finally, 
Randall Schweller contends that, absent a legitimate check on the unipole, the 
international system will be characterized by increased randomness and disarray; 
as this disorder reaches a crescendo, the international system will revert to 
multipolarity (Schweller, 2010). However, none of the actors in this novel 
multipolar arrangement will have any incentive to balance and seek relative military 
power (ibid., 2010). Thus, Schweller advances a slightly altered conception of the 
multipolar system after unipolarity.  
  
Other scholars hold the opposite. Stephen Walt held that hard balancing 
against the unipolar United States was unlikely. Instead, less consequential actors 
will, at most, engage in soft balancing in which they accept the international 
distribution of power but endeavor to obtain better outcomes within it; yet another 
option, Walt holds, is leash slipping: states form coalitions not to usurp the global 
hegemon, but to gain instead a sense of autonomy and hedge against future 
uncertainties (Walt, 2005). Likewise, John Ikenberry holds that the unipolar system 
can be preserved. Ikenberry contends that the stability of the unipolar system is 
contingent upon the behavior of the unipole itself: because the unipole wields such 
disproportionate power in the system, its behavior will have the most significant 
impact on the preservation of the system (2011). Ultimately, the contemporary 
discourse surrounding great power politics is robust. Despite competing 
conceptions of great power dynamics, relevant actors within the system, and the 
system’s constraints, the theory rests on firm ground. Accordingly, discussions of 
Russia as a great power are wholly founded.  
 Examples linking Putin’s foreign policy rhetoric to the actions of a state 
actively reclaiming its seat at the proverbial great power table are plenty. Even 
Putin himself, as Andrei Tsygankov points out, has highlighted the exigency 
surrounding Russia’s desire to be perceived as a great power: “[s]uch a country as 
Russia can only survive and develop within the existing borders if it stays as a great 
power. During all of its times of weakness … Russia was invariably confronted 
with the threat of disintegration” (Tsygankov, 2005).  
For many scholars, the experience of the Russo-Georgian war crystallized 
the notion that the Russian Federation under Putin was hell-bent on restoring its 
status as a great power. Thus, it is unsurprising that the events that unfolded in 
Ukraine were understood in a similar vein. For example, writing in Foreign Affairs, 
John Mearsheimer opined that the Western consensus holds that the blame for the 
Ukraine crisis lies exclusively with Russia: “Russian President Vladimir Putin, the 
argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the 
Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other 
countries in eastern Europe” (Mearsheimer, 2014). Ultimately, the contemporary 
analysis of Russian behavior under Putin firmly places the Federation at the table 
with the world’s other great powers; the means through which Putin achieved this 











Second Chechen War 
Despite mainly being a domestic conflict, Putin’s intervention in the region 
is critical for understanding how Putin reacts when one of Russia’s national 
interests is under threat. This domestic insurrection, and Putin’s subsequent 
decision to crush it with overwhelming force, is easily explained as a response to 
defending Russia’s most important national interest: “prevent[ing] armed 
aggression against Russia and secession of territories from Russia” (Saradzhyan, 
2018). Moreover, crushing the rebellion in Chechnya was critical for establishing a 
strong state. Putin’s stated aims of strengthening the state while creating the 
conditions for economic growth would be impossible if separatists within Russia’s 
borders could wreak havoc throughout the Federation and beyond (Tsygankov 
2014). A strong state must have the means to project authority and autonomy 
beyond the periphery of its borders. Logically, then, a precondition for achieving 
this end is achieving domestic stability and security. In this regard, Putin’s 
aggressive rhetoric towards the Chechen separatists is much more understandable: 
the pledge to “whack them in the outhouse” is used to project an image of a strong 
and omnipotent state (Dixon, 2000). In Putin’s Russia, a subversive actor cannot 
even relieve one’s self in peace.   
The Second Chechen war can be best understood as a series of counter-
terrorist operations in the North Caucasus that had the ultimate aim of pacifying an 
intractable region. Despite the local nature of the conflict, the separatist movement 
in Chechnya had the potential to promulgate beyond the Northern Caucasus. 
Moreover, the terrorist attacks of September 11 enabled Putin to frame his actions 
in Chechnya as but a small part of a global war on terrorism (Calzini, 2005). 
Ultimately, these developments would provide Putin with an arduous, yet golden, 
opportunity to “bolster his domestic and international posture” and establish his 
conception of the strong, autonomous Russian state (Tsygankov, 2019).  
  In 1996 an initial peace agreement with Chechen rebels put an official end 
to the First Chechen war; however, idleness from Moscow after this agreement was 
signed, creating space for anarchy to spread throughout the restive republic (ibid., 
2019).5 The second round of the armed insurgency against the Russian state was 
commenced with the explicit goal of “creating a unified Chechen-Dagestani 
Muslim state” (Evangelista, 2002). Putin, who was appointed prime minister by 
Yeltsin several days after the incursion into Dagestan, had no choice but to crush 
the bourgeoning insurgency (ibid., 2002). This conflict provided Putin with the 
clearest opportunity to establish a strong state. It satisfied both of Saradzhyan’s 
necessary conditions for armed aggression: first, according to our model, the 
conflict represented an “acute threat to Russia’s vital national interest [that] could 
not be neutralized by any means short of force” (Saradzhyan, 2018). The conflict 
  
also satisfied the second condition, as Moscow had a “reasonable hope” that the use 
of armed force would “yield a net reduction in threats to Russia’s vital national 
interest” (ibid., 2018).  
As has been mentioned, maintaining Russia’s territorial integrity is 
inextricably linked with Putin’s desire to reestablish the strong state. An armed 
insurgency is a direct threat to regional security and, therefore, stability. However, 
on a deeper level, if the armed insurgency in the Northern Caucasus led to political 
and territorial concessions from Moscow, it would have, in all likelihood, triggered 
a bank run on state sovereignty.  
The post-Soviet space is an area of decolonization, and the Russian 
Federation was no exception to this reality (Toal, 2017). According to the 
Washington Post, at least sixty recognized ethnic groups are within the Federation 
(2008). One such example is the people of Tatarstan; similar to the inhabitants of 
the Northern Caucasus, the Tatars have their own rich culture and history that is 
undoubtedly linked with Russia’s own, yet can still stand independent of the 
Federation. In 1991, president Yeltsin told the people of the Tatar Autonomous 
Republic to “take as much sovereignty as they could swallow” (Erlanger 1992). In 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation 
was struggling to prevent a bursting at the seams. Thus, a mere nine years removed 
from the collapse, leaders of the sixteen autonomous republics within Russia, 
Tatarstan included, were surely following the developments in Chechnya closely: 
what happened in the Northern Caucasus would be an important test of Russia’s 
ability under Putin to hold itself together (ibid., 1992). With this context, it is 
painfully evident that Putin’s ability to suppress the unrest in Chechnya would 
directly impact his ability to reestablish the strong state in Russia.  
At least initially, the conflict enjoyed a high degree of popularity. 
Nonetheless, the reality on the ground presented challenges for Putin’s vision of an 
autonomous, pragmatic foreign policy that was bolstered by the strong state within 
Russia. The most serious challenge to Putin’s policies during this time would come 
from the tragedy that took place in the school in Belsan (Calzini, 2005).6 This 
incident would profoundly alter the perception of the war and Putin’s handling of 
it by both the public and the Russian authorities (ibid., 2005). The incident, and the 
botched reaction, shattered the perception that Putin was delivering on his promise 
to eradicate the threat of terrorism in the region and undermined the idea of the 
efficacy of the strong state (Tsygankov, 2019).  
Despite criticism from both the public and the authorities, Putin would 
ultimately rebound and use the Beslan incident as the opportunity to consolidate 
the strong state.7 Moreover, a rhetorical emphasis was placed on the strong state, as 
Putin emphasized the necessity of military opposition to the existential threat that 
terrorism posed to the Russian Federation (Calzini, 2005). Lastly, Putin decided to 
exert centralized political authority over the resistive Chechen Republic. The prior 
  
system of federalism was supplanted by centralized control from Moscow: Putin 
nominated the local governors whom local legislative bodies would then approve. 
(Tsygankov, 2019).  
The case of the Second Chechen war provided Putin with challenges and 
opportunities to disseminate his version of the strong state and an autonomous 
foreign policy. Faced with the direct threat of armed succession, Putin had no other 
option but to mobilize a military response. Despite some shortcomings, the Second 
Chechen war ultimately provided the means for Putin to consolidate his domestic 
power and promote an assertive foreign policy that was skeptical of outside, 
coercive influences.  
 
2008 Russo-Georgian War 
The second case study deals with the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. This 
conflict corresponds with the second area of this article’s analytical framework: 
Russia’s bilateral, transactional approach with its less powerful neighbors. Further, 
this conflict also incorporates elements of framework four, as the inroads that 
NATO, and specifically the U.S., made in Russia’s “privileged zone of influence” 
ultimately provided part of the rationale for the foray into Georgia.  
To understand the relevant dynamics at play in this conflict, one must 
understand the convoluted and communal aspects of the relationship between the 
Russians, the Georgians, and the Ossetians. The relationship between South Ossetia 
and Georgia has been replete with tension since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Ultimately, as competing conceptions of nationalism came to dominate the post-
Soviet space, the positions of the elites in South Ossetia, a distinct entity within the 
Georgian state, and Georgia proper became increasingly irreconcilable. (Toal, 
2017).  
The Ossetians are an ethnic minority numbering just a half million people; 
they speak Russian and Ossetic, an Eastern Alanic language; throughout their 
history, they have straddled both sides of the Caucasus Mountains, leaving most 
Ossetians living in the Russian republic of North Ossetia; however, the community 
on the southern side also formed a unified population leading to the creation of 
South Ossetia as an autonomous region in Soviet Georgia (ibid., 2017).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the relatively peaceful 
equilibrium that existed between the Georgians and Ossetians. From 1989-1992 
violence engulfed South Ossetia, and it left a lasting impact on the region. In June 
1992, a tentative peace agreement, known as the Sochi Agreement, brokered by the 
United Nations and signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian 
president Eduard Shevardnadze ultimately curtailed the violence (Wolff). The 
significance of this peace agreement cannot be de-emphasized, as it provides a 
prominent example of Russian bilateralism, namely, how the Kremlin operates 
within a rational-legal framework to coerce its less powerful neighbors. Moreover, 
  
this agreement provided the Kremlin with a legitimate pretense for defending the 
South Ossetians if it chose to do so.   
When the Sochi Agreement was signed, Georgia was a fragile state. 
Shevardnadze had just acquired power through a violent coup, and by his own 
account Georgia was not sufficiently powerful to intervene in South Ossetia with 
force: “To put it briefly, the Georgians were not ready for war, and they were 
defeated” (RFE/RL 2006). Despite being mired in its domestic instability, Russia 
sensed an opportunity to exert influence in its former Soviet holding. Accordingly, 
Russia negotiated peace in the region via a Joint Control Commission (Toal, 2017). 
Multilateral by definition only, the commission’s composition ensured that Russia 
would have a disproportionate influence in the region so long as the peace 
agreement remained valid. The members of the peace-keeping commission were as 
follows: the Georgian government, South Ossetian secessionist authorities, the 
Russian republic of North Ossetia, and the Russian government (Socor, 2008). 
Functionally, then, Georgia was outnumbered three to one. Russia and its Ossetian 
proxies, along with a Georgian contingent, would provide the manpower for the 
peace-keeping forces. Thus, Georgia was essentially left isolated, forced to deal 
with a threefold Russian presence in its own sovereign territory. Ultimately, the 
Sochi Agreement proved to be a relatively reliable peace-keeping mechanism, as it 
maintained stability in the region for several years. The official Russian position 
held that South Ossetia, and the Georgian republic of Abkhazia, were “unresolved 
conflicts within the territory of the state of Georgia” (Toal, 2017).  
In 2003 dynamics in the region once again changed as the Rose Revolution 
brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Saakashvili was a Western-facing liberal 
who promulgated notions of democratization and a Georgian nationalist who 
advocated for restoring Georgian territorial integrity (ibid., 2017). From the onset 
of his presidency, Saakashvili would take actions that both antagonized and 
distressed his northern neighbor.  
Saakashvili’s desire to reestablish Georgia’s territorial integrity put him in 
a precarious position vis-à-vis the Kremlin, which had a clear preference for the 
status quo. Seemingly, Saakashvili’s desire to “get Georgia back” was, at the very 
least, unrealistic, and in all likelihood, untenable. Russia and Georgia were not, 
however, on a predetermined path for conflict. The means through which 
Saakashvili decided to establish authority over South Ossetia would matter 
significantly to Moscow. Saakashvili, a notoriously impatient man, concluded that 
the best way to constrain South Ossetia was by rebuilding the coercive capabilities 
of the Georgian state (ibid., 2017).  
Saakashvili’s strategy in South Ossetia was to establish Georgian authority 
in the region by choking its economic lifelines.8 The South Ossetian president at 
the time, Eduard Kokoyty, framed Saakashvili’s actions as unfettered aggression 
against all Ossetians and not as narrowly tailored measures to combat corruption. 
  
This rhetoric consolidated Kokoyty’s political power within South Ossetia, and it 
emboldened him to lobby the Russian Duma to fully incorporate South Ossetia into 
Russia (ibid., 2017). Russia refused to take such actions. Instead, Moscow 
condemned Georgia’s aggression. In turn, Tbilisi condemned what it classified as 
illegal military convoys coming in from Russia (ibid., 2017). This back-and-forth 
would continue for some time.  
In his endeavor to forcefully assert Georgia’s territorial authority over South 
Ossetia, Saakashvili, in all likelihood, undermined any opportunity for a peaceful 
settlement between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, as the consequences of Saakashvili’s 
anti-corruption crusade were twofold: first, the campaign sent Georgian troops into 
areas of South Ossetia that they had not entered since the signing of the Sochi 
Agreement This, in turn, led to the complete breakdown of the negotiation 
mechanism of the Joint Control Commission (ibid., 2017). Thus, Saakashvili’s 
efforts to pacify and govern the restive republic had the opposite effect. Equally as 
important, Saakashvili’s unilateralism in South Ossetia transformed the dynamic 
between Tbilisi and Moscow. Saakashvili and Putin went from reluctant 
cooperators to two forces that found themselves on opposite sides of the Ossetian 
conundrum. Almost overnight, Georgia transformed from subservient cooperator 
to erratic agitator. For Moscow, dealing with the volatility caused by the policies 
of Saakashvili was an unfavorable development.  
From 2004 to 2006, Georgia and Russia would engage in a tit-for-tat game 
of escalation. For Moscow, the Beslan incident underscored the risks associated 
with instability on the periphery of the Russian Federation. Thus, it became all the 
more necessary for the Kremlin to maintain stability in South Ossetia, as an 
unstable Tskhinvali could have negative and violent repercussions in the north, and 
this would simply not be tolerated (ibid., 2017). On February 15, 2006, the 
Georgian parliament unanimously passed a resolution ordering the government to 
replace the Russian-led peace-keeping forces with “an effective international 
peace-keeping operation” (ibid., 2017). In turn, the Russians would respond 
economically. The Kremlin first imposed an embargo on imported Georgian wine 
and later did the same to Georgian mineral water (ibid., 2017). Relations between 
the two states would continue to deteriorate as Saakashvili upped his aggression.  
The second framework in our model, namely Russia’s preference for a 
bilateral, transactional approach with its neighbors, was almost wholly undermined 
at this point. However, developments discussed thus far are not wholly sufficient 
to explain why these tensions ultimately culminated in war. To this end, the fourth 
element of this article’s analytical framework can bridge this gap: Russia qualified 
Saakashvili’s belligerence as an extension of Western infringement.  
Saakashvili’s geopolitical pugnacity was not devoid of supporters and 
accomplices. In May 2005, Saakashvili hosted President Bush in Tbilisi. 
Galvanized by Bush’s visit, Saakashvili held that it was “the final confirmation that 
  
Georgia is an independent country whose borders and territory are inviolable. The 
red line lies on the Caucasus Range, and no one should cross it to this side” (2005). 
Certainly, Saakashvili made great leaps in his assumption that Bush’s visit was 
tantamount to a blank check affirming Georgia’s right to sovereignty through any 
means necessary. Nevertheless, the U.S. does bear some responsibility for 
emboldening Saakashvili.   
After Saakashvili visited the White House in 2004, Bush proclaimed that 
the Georgian head of state was “our guy” (2004). Moreover, both U.S. and 
Georgian officials developed a habit of referring to each other as “all[ies],” despite 
the reality that no such formal agreement existed between the two parties (de Walle, 
2013). Bush held that Saakashvili was a transformative leader, and he lauded him 
accordingly; in return, Saakashvili championed democratic reforms and state-
building initiatives, at least rhetorically.  
The most consequential aspect of their relationship, however, was 
Saakashvili’s keenness to participate in the U.S. led War on Terror in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.9 Saakashvili’s intentions in supporting this conflict were 
sufficiently transparent: Georgia was rapidly pursuing NATO membership, and the 
U.S. reciprocated that interest (Kramer, 2007). After Bush’s fateful 2005 visit to 
the Georgian capital, Saakashvili intensified his courtship of NATO, holding that 
membership in the organization would facilitate the peaceful resolution of 
Georgia’s territorial disputes (Toal, 2017). On March 19, 2008, President Bush 
unequivocally articulated his desire for Georgian membership in NATO: “I believe 
that NATO benefits with a Georgian membership. I believe Georgia benefits from 
being a part of NATO. And I told the President it’s a message I’ll be taking to 
Bucharest soon” (2008). Nevertheless, at its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, 
NATO members Germany and France expressed aversion towards Georgia’s 
ascension into the alliance for fear that it would unnecessarily agitate Russia; 
ultimately, a compromise would be reached: short of beginning the formal process 
for NATO membership, the alliance issued a statement endorsing the NATO 
aspirations of Georgia (Mearsheimer, 2014).  
Putin’s pushback to the relationship between Georgia, the U.S., and NATO 
should have come as no surprise. After all, why should Russia view NATO 
expansion in its backyard as a benign development? For the Russians, NATO 
expansion is perceived as the proliferation of a hostile sphere of influence on the 
periphery of its territory (Toal, 2017). Former Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev 
held as much in justifying Russia’s response to the 2008 war: “By declaring the 
Caucasus, a region that is thousands of miles from the American continent, a sphere 
of its ‘national interest’ the United States made a serious blunder” (2008). 
Furthermore, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, then Prime Minister Putin 
held that Georgia’s desire to join NATO was “an effort to drag other countries and 
other peoples into their bloody adventures” (2008).  
  
In light of both U.S. rhetoric and action, Russians had legitimate reasons to 
express trepidation over the potential aggression coming from the U.S.-backed 
Georgian regime. Suppose Russia wanted to preserve its great power status. In that 
case, it could not sit idly by as Georgia used force against an ethnic minority the 
Russians had vowed to protect, especially if the West would tacitly endorse this 
aggression.  
Ultimately, tensions between Georgia and Russia would culminate into full-
scale conflict. The “Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Conflict in Georgia,” colloquially referred to as the “Tagliavini Report” after 
its team leader, Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, concluded that Saakashvili’s 
Georgia fired the first shot (de Waal, 2015). It did not, however, completely absolve 
Russia from guilt.10  
To a certain extent, the Tagliavini Report bolstered the Russian narrative of 
the conflict, which supports this article’s analytical model. First, the Kremlin held 
that it would make Georgia pay for its aggression and unilateral attempt to 
destabilize the region. Second, the Russian narrative emphasized that Russian 
troops had the legal right to be present in Georgian territory through the lawfully 
sanctioned peace-keeping mission (Toal, 2017). Piggybacking on this sentiment, 
Russian president Medvedev characterized Georgia’s actions as aggression towards 
Russian soldiers and Russian citizens (ibid., 2017).11 This narrative shaped Russia 
as the legally sanctioned guarantors of security in the region; accordingly, they had 
an obligation to respond to Georgia’s aggression. 
Moreover, the Russian narrative of the Russo-Georgian War conforms with 
the fourth framework of our model. At the end of August, the Kremlin declared its 
rejection of U.S. unipolarity with President Medvedev stating: “We cannot accept 
a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and 
influential a county as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and 
threatened by conflict” (2008). At the same time, he confirmed Russia’s 
commitment to pragmatic cooperation but noted Russia’s right to protect “the lives 
and dignity of [its] citizens, wherever they may be” (2008). Echoing both great 
power logic and bilateralism, Medvedev held: “as is the case of other countries, 
there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests…[w]e will pay particular 
attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries” 
(2008). Finally, in 2011, Medvedev characterized the 2008 War as a case of 
Russia’s successful intervention to stop NATO expansionism: “[i]f we had faltered 
in 2008, the geopolitical arrangement would be different now and a number of 
countries attempting to artificially drag themselves into the North Atlantic Alliance 
would probably be there now” (2011).   
 It is now relatively easy to understand why Saakashvili behaved with such 
hubris and aggression in the run-up to the 2008 war. Likewise, it is also clear why 
Russia responded in the way it did. As a re-emerging great power, Russia could not 
  
sit idly by as Georgian belligerence and U.S. unilateralism destabilized its 
“privileged zone of influence.” 
  
The Ukraine Conflict 
In our analytical model, Russia’s third area of national interest is to “prevent 
emergence and/or expansion of individual hostile powers and/or hostile alliances 
on or near Russian borders” (Saradzhyan, 2018). This area of Russia’s national 
interest, and therefore the Ukraine conflict as a whole, corresponds with our 
model’s third framework: the Russian incursion into Ukraine corresponded with 
Russian geopolitical culture, and more specifically, with the concept of the “Near 
Aboard” (Toal, 2017).  
The phrase “Near Abroad” connotes a geopolitical field replete with 
“difference[s] yet also enduring proximity” (ibid., 2017).12 The notion of a near 
abroad intricately weaves together bits of history, fiction, and reality on the ground 
in an attempt to articulate a cogent conception of a state’s enduring connections to 
a broader region that, at times, extend beyond a nation’s hard borders. Nevertheless, 
because of these aforementioned ties, dominant states argue that they should be the 
ones who dictate regional developments within their own near abroad.  It is 
precisely these aforementioned ties that enable the post-Soviet space to be classified 
as Russia’s near abroad, and by extension, its privileged zone of influence. Further, 
it is the country of Ukraine, precisely its eastern half and the Crimean Peninsula, 
that occupies a unique place within this complex geopolitical field.   
 Historically, Ukraine’s fate has been inextricably linked to its geopolitical 
location (Toal, 1997). Ukraine’s origins can be traced back to Kievan Rus, which 
was established in the 800s by the Viking king Rurik, and ultimately emerged as a 
consolidated and influential state by the eleventh century (Hager, 2019). The Rurik 
era ended with the burning and sacking of Kyiv in 1240 by the Mongols (ibid,. 
2019). Under Mongol control, however, it was Moscow, and not Kyiv, that rose to 
become the most powerful of the Rus’ principalities during this era “by becoming 
the loyal surrogate for the Mongol khans” (ibid,. 2019). Upon the culmination of 
Mongol rule, Moscow invoked claims of descent from the Rurikids in order to 
justify imperial territorial expansion (ibid., 2019). The practice of invoking 
historical sophisms to justify territorial expansion would dominate Moscow’s 
foreign policy as it related to Ukraine, as throughout history, a majority of Russian 
expansionism has been driven by the notion that all Eastern Slavic peoples should 
be united under Russian rule (Plokhy, 2017). 
This narrative is further supplemented by the patchwork nature of the 
Ukrainian state. Putin, in 2008, cryptically declared to George W. Bush at the 2008 
NATO summit in Bucharest: “George, you do not realize that Ukraine is not even 
a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territory is Eastern Europe but the greater part 
is a gift from us!” (2008). For a long time, Russian nationalist politicians presented 
  
ethnic Russians as the largest divided nation on earth and insisted on the exigency 
of reunification (Tsygankov, 2015). Furthermore, the Crimean peninsula 
represented the archetypal example of the near aboard: a region dominated by 
ethnic Russians, but yet evaded Moscow’s jurisdiction.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inhabitants of Crimea narrowly 
voted to endorse Ukrainian independence; nevertheless, ethnic Russians living on 
the peninsula attempted, but ultimately failed, to organize a separatist effort, which 
received support from the Russian Duma and robust patronal networks in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (Toal, 2017). Although a tangible and consequential separatist 
movement failed to manifest in Crimea, the pro-Russia sentiment that permeated 
large swaths of the peninsula remained an influential dormant factor that the 
Kremlin could choose to activate at any time if they felt their interests were being 
threatened in the region.  
After Crimea, the Donbas basin, an area comprising the oblasts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk, has the largest minority concentration of ethnic Russians in Ukraine 
(ibid., 2017). Furthermore, the inhabitants of this region have meaningful cultural, 
linguistic, and economic links to Russia. As with Crimea, the lands of eastern 
Ukraine have had centuries-long habituation to the Russian way of life (Sotiriou, 
2016). Additionally, the Donbas is a region of great strategic and industrial 
importance.13 Because of its status as a region forged by Soviet industrialization, 
the Donbas “developed a distinct regional identity that endured after Soviet 
collapse...it functioned almost as a third space between independent Ukraine and 
Russia” (Toal, 2017). Critically, partisans of both nations promulgated historical 
sophisms that promoted the notion that the Donbas was a part of both of their 
respective “national patrimonies” (ibid., 2017).  
One such sophism was that of Novorossiya, which characterized the Donbas 
and its inhabitants as a natural extension of Russia and her people (Teper, 2016). 
Having legitimate origins, Novorossiya was a historic region in imperial Russia 
extending from the Black Sea to subsume both Donetsk and Luhansk. Russian 
nationalists invoked Novorossiya as the historical and contemporary home of a two-
part interest group, ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (O’Loughlin, 
et al., 2016). Ultimately, the notion of Novorossiya remained in the political 
margins in both Ukraine and Russia; however, Russian state officials viewed it, like 
Russia’s history with Crimea, as a latent geopolitical asset that could be activated 
when their interests in the region were under threat.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was 
incredibly reluctant to view Ukraine as an independent, sovereign political unit. 
Nonetheless, the two states made some marginal diplomatic strides during the 
1990s.14 Contrariwise, those in the West saw Ukraine’s newfound independence as 
a geopolitical opportunity. Specifically, an independent Ukraine was seen as a 
potential bulwark against Russian aggression, as well as a physical barrier that 
  
could bifurcate a democratizing Europe against a more authoritarian Eurasia 
(Brzezinski, 1997). Nevertheless, to the Russians the warning was stark: “allow 
Ukraine to join Euro-Atlantic space and Russia’s power will be fatally weakened” 
(Toal, 2017). This dichotomy would be a mainstay of Western-Russian relations 
and it was vindicated by their competing conceptions of the international order. For 
Putin, Ukraine’s accession into NATO was a proverbial red line that was not to be 
crossed (ibid., 2017). Putin’s posture on Ukraine and NATO revealed Russia’s 
fundamental concern in the region: ensuring that Ukraine would remain in the orbit 
of Moscow. Ukraine’s accession into NATO represented the most cogent threat to 
Russia’s near abroad.  
In February 2010, Victor Yanukovych was elected as the new president of 
Ukraine. Yanukovych’s victory ensured that an anti-Kremlin regime would be 
replaced by a government that desired closer ties with Moscow (Tsygankov, 2015). 
Russia capitalized on the pro-Moscow sentiment emanating from Ukraine through 
a series of negotiations that would reaffirm Moscow’s influence over Kiev.15 
Nonetheless, although Russia-Ukraine relations had undoubtedly improved under 
Yanukovych’s regime, Ukrainian leadership would not simply acquiesce to the 
demands of the Russian Federation. Rather than follow the example of Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine denied the invitation into a Russian-led customs union, and 
instead proposed “a special, 3 by 1 format of relationships with the organization 
that would allow it to continue its integration with the European Union” (ibid., 
2015). Despite this initial rejection, Putin tried to entice the Ukrainian leadership 
by including in the customs union offer another significant discount in energy 
prices and an additional 15 billion dollar aid package; ultimately, this offer was too 
good for Yanukovych to refuse, and at the 2013 E.U. summit in Vilnius the 
Ukrainian president announced his decision to postpone an association agreement 
with the E.U. (Tsygankov, 2015).  
Yanukovych’s decision would prove to be the primary catalyst for the 
subsequent developments in Crimea and the Donbas region. The Euromaidan 
protests, which officially began on November 21, 2013, were crystallized by the 
abrupt and ostensibly capricious policy shift from the pro-European to the pro-
Russian transnational economic association (Shveda & Park, 2015). In addition to 
serving as a censure of Yanukovych’s waffling, the Euromaidan protests were more 
fundamentally related to the lack of political and economic progress within 
Ukraine. Overall, the Euromaidan protests were always about more than just a trade 
deal, as the rejection of the E.U.’s association agreement symbolized Ukraine’s 
increasing descent into an authoritarian kleptocracy (Toal, 2015).16  
The Kremlin did not share the sentiments of the West when it came to the 
developments of Euromaidan. Instead of seeing the demonstrations as a massive 
rebuke of a wildly unpopular leader, Moscow perceived these developments as 
Kyiv’s ultimate betrayal of Russian interests and values in its near abroad. The 
  
Kremlin propagated the notion that Euromaidan was a coup led by fascist elements 
in western Ukraine who were determined to move Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit 
and undermine, or even destroy, the Russian elements of Ukraine (Hager, 
2016).  Moreover, Moscow saw these developments as yet another movement 
instigated by the United States, akin to the movements in Serbia in 2000 and the 
2011 Arab Spring (Tsygankov, 2015). Given the deep cultural, economic, and 
linguistic links between Russia and parts of Ukraine, Moscow decided that it could 
not lose the region to the West; thus, the choice was made to partition the country 
and annex the Crimean Peninsula.   
 
Syrian Conflict 
In our analytical model, the fourth tier corresponds with Russia’s desire to 
re-emerge as a great power. Suspicious of the United States’ geopolitical 
motivations in a relatively unstable international environment, Russia’s return to 
great power status would coincide with the state’s ability to challenge the U.S.’ 
pursuit of geopolitical dominance around the globe (Tsygankov, 2019). The Syrian 
Civil War and subsequent anarchy inside the country provided Putin with the ideal 
opportunity to reassert Russia’s status as a global power by challenging the US-
centered order.  
Russia’s links to the Middle East go back to at least the Mediaeval times; 
however, Russia’s involvement in Syria is much more recent (Trenin, 2018). In 
October 1973, without consulting the Kremlin, Syria, and Egypt would launch an 
attack against Israel (Trenin, 2018). After initial Arab success, the tides of the war 
quickly turned in Israel’s favor; ultimately, the disastrous incursion pushed Cairo 
closer to the West, as seeking peace with Israel necessarily pushed Egypt into 
Washington’s sphere of influence (ibid., 2018).17 Ultimately, the Soviet Union 
would lose Egypt, as Cairo found itself comfortably within the U.S.’s embrace; 
only Syria, Libya, and the PLO would reject the peace agreement between Israel 
and Egypt (ibid., 2018). After these developments, Syria became Moscow’s closest 
ally in the region: expelled from Egyptian ports, the Soviet Navy began to use 
Syria’s Tartus as a supply and maintenance facility (ibid., 2018).  
By the spring of 2011, when the Arab Spring movement had made inroads 
in Syria, the alliance between Damascus and Moscow had deteriorated significantly 
(ibid., 2018). The military facility in Tartus was decrepit, staffed only by fifty 
individuals; moreover, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had only visited Moscow 
once during his eleven years in charge of the country (ibid., 2018). Far from an 
ironclad alliance, the relationship between Damascus and Moscow was, at best, a 
pragmatic partnership. Despite these dynamics, Putin would ultimately decide to 
intervene with force to prop up the Assad regime.   
A superficial analysis of the timing of Russia’s military intervention would 
lend itself to the conclusion that Moscow decided to preserve the Assad regime in 
  
an endeavor to maintain stability in the region and to prevent the exportation of 
terrorism into Russia proper.18 This analysis is undoubtedly accurate; however, it 
is also incomplete: Russia’s longing to re-emerge as a great power also informed 
her decision to intervene in the Syrian Civil War. 
Russia’s pursuit of great power status should be understood as a means to 
counter the U.S.’s quest for global geopolitical hegemony. Ultimately, through 
Syria, Putin would make the point that U.S.-driven regime change in the Middle 
East had limits (ibid., 2018). Our article’s framework captures the essence of 
Russian military intervention in Syria: the primary motivation behind the incursion 
was to send a message to the global community regarding Russia’s newfound 
position in the global order. Eliminating the terrorist threat coming out of Syria and 
stabilizing the Assad regime was simply a means to an end, not the end itself.   
Obama, now infamously, held that Assad would not last long after the U.S. 
began supporting opposition forces in Syria; Putin directly challenged this assertion 
by throwing Moscow’s military weight behind a regime the Americans had 
considered illegitimate (ibid., 2018). Suppose Russia could fulfill its independent 
policy goals beyond its borders, especially in the convoluted Middle East. In that 
case, it could prove to the world that it had re-emerged as a great power. Russia did 
not endeavor to eradicate the U.S. presence in Syria; instead, the Kremlin was 
merely seeking recognition from Washington. Far from being an indispensable ally, 
Syria was still a valuable client of Moscow. The experiences of the Arab Spring 
crystalized the Kremlin’s desire to ensure the stability of the Syrian state through 
the preservation of the Assad regime. The U.S.’s unilateralism in Syria, which 
evoked memories of the Libyan calamity, was an unacceptable development that 
required a serious response from Moscow.   
After observing the current Syrian quagmire, one would be hard-pressed to 
declare any one party victorious. However, Assad and his regime have survived, 
and his survival can be directly attributed to Russian intervention. Because of his 
survival, Russia is now guaranteed a seat at the table whenever the relevant actors 
meet to decide the future of Syria. These dynamics are also consistent with Putin’s 
desire to reassert Russia’s great power status. Shortly before Russia intervened in 
Syria, Putin, speaking at the U.N., mused over the post World War II Yalta 
conference: “I remind you that the key decisions on the principles guiding the 
cooperation among states, as well as on the establishment of the United Nations, 
were made in our country, in Yalta, at the meeting of the anti-Hitler coalition 
leaders” (2015). In involving Russia in the war in Syria, Putin was hoping to find 
himself in Stalin’s position at Yalta: meeting with the other great powers of the 
globe to reorganize the world into spheres of influence. Admittedly, negotiations in 
Geneva and Astana are not playing out as they did in Yalta; nevertheless, Putin’s 
intervention has guaranteed that Russia’s interests will not be ignored when the 
time comes to decide upon the future of the Syrian state. This stands in stark 
  
contrast with the developments before 2015 when the United States and its proxies 
were engaged in a concerted effort to depose of Moscow’s only ally in the region. 




Russia is not a monolith. Attempting to understand why Russia responds to 
some threats with military force requires an in-depth analysis of a host of relevant 
factors. Based on the earlier work of Simon Saradzhyan, this article presented a 
four-tired analytical framework that endeavored to provide a compressive 
explanation for Russia’s military incursions during the Putin era. Our research 
framework ultimately identified a secondary set of conditions that further explained 
Russian national interest; these conditions proved to be harbingers of conflict. In 
sum, Russia will not hesitate to respond with force when its critical national 
interests are undermined. Thus, understanding what constitutes Russian national 
interest is a critical goal, as doing so ensures a degree of predictability in an 
increasingly unpredictable international environment. Rather than being a 
Matryoshka doll of mystery, as Churchill famously held, Moscow is 
misunderstood. This article endeavored to ameliorate our understanding of the 
Federation’s interests in the foreign policy arena, thus removing the veneer of 
unpredictability that currently obscures the normative aspects of Kremlin decision-
making.  
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